Systems of Visual Identification: Lessons from Epistemic Logic (with Jaakko Hintikka) in Philosophy of Science 70: 89-104, 2003

This paper shows how developments in epistemic logic can play a nontrivial role in cognitive neuroscience. We argue that the striking correspondence between two modes of identification, as distinguished in the epistemic context, and two cognitive systems distinguished by neuroscientific investigation of the visual system (the “where” and “what” systems) is not coincidental, and that…

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“Explanation, Representation and the Dynamical Hypothesis” Minds and Machines 11: 521-541, 2001

This paper challenges arguments that systematic patterns of intelligent behavior license the claim that representations must play a role in the cognitive system analogous to that played by syntactical structures in a computer program. In place of traditional computational models, I argue that research inspired by Dynamical Systems theory can support an alternative view of representations. My…

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