Posts Tagged ‘philosophical methodology’
“Ontology and Methodology in Analytic Philosophy” in Theories and Applications of Ontology Vol. 1 J. Seibt and R. Poli (eds.) New York: Springer. 349-394, 2010.
This is a highly incomplete sketch of the methodology and history of ontology in the analytic tradition from Frege to Lewis. It appeared as Chapter 16 of Theories and Applications of Ontology Vol. 1 J. Seibt and R. Poli (eds.) New York: Springer. 349-394, 2010. You can read a penultimate version here: Ontology and Methodology…
Read More“Intuition and Philosophical Methodology” Axiomathes (2008) 18:67–89
Intuition serves a variety of roles in contemporary philosophy. This paper provides a historical discussion of the revival of intuition in the 1970s, untangling some of the ways that intuition has been used and offering some suggestions concerning its proper place in philosophical investigation. Contrary to some interpretations of the results of experimental philosophy, I…
Read More“The Complexity of Information Processing Tasks in Vision.’” In Carlos Gershenson, Diederik Aerts, and Bruce Edmonds (eds.) “Philosophy and Complexity: Essays on Epistemology, Evolution, and Emergence.” Singapore: World Scientific 300-314, 2007
The basic presupposition of cognitive science is that mental life is more complicated (or complex) than it appears; there is more to memory, attention, perception and the like, than meets the inner eye. In most mainstream cognitive science, the hidden workings of the mind are treated as information processing systems…Read more here: The Complexity of Information…
Read More“Explanation, Representation and the Dynamical Hypothesis” Minds and Machines 11: 521-541, 2001
This paper challenges arguments that systematic patterns of intelligent behavior license the claim that representations must play a role in the cognitive system analogous to that played by syntactical structures in a computer program. In place of traditional computational models, I argue that research inspired by Dynamical Systems theory can support an alternative view of representations. My…
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