Tag Archives: Philosophy of Mind

“The Complexity of Information Processing Tasks in Vision.’” In Carlos Gershenson, Diederik Aerts, and Bruce Edmonds (eds.) “Philosophy and Complexity: Essays on Epistemology, Evolution, and Emergence.” Singapore: World Scientific 300-314, 2007

The basic presupposition of cognitive science is that mental life is more complicated (or complex) than it appears; there is more to memory, attention, perception and the like, than meets the inner eye.  In most mainstream cognitive science, the hidden workings of the mind are treated as information processing systems…Read more here: The Complexity of Information Processing Tasks in Vision

Systems of Visual Identification: Lessons from Epistemic Logic (with Jaakko Hintikka) in Philosophy of Science 70: 89-104, 2003

This paper shows how developments in epistemic logic can play a nontrivial role in cognitive neuroscience. We argue that the striking correspondence between two modes of identification, as distinguished in the epistemic context, and two cognitive systems distinguished by neuroscientific investigation of the visual system (the “where” and “what” systems) is not coincidental, and that it can play a clarificatory role at the most fundamental levels of neuroscientific theory. Read more here:  Systems of Visual Identification in Neuroscience- Lessons from Epistemic Logic

This paper was reprinted in Jaakko Hintikka’s book Socratic Epistemology: Explorations of Knowledge Seeking by Questioning Cambridge University Press (2007)


“Explanation, Representation and the Dynamical Hypothesis” Minds and Machines 11: 521-541, 2001

This paper challenges arguments that systematic patterns of intelligent behavior license the claim that representations must play a role in the cognitive system analogous to that played by syntactical structures in a computer program. In place of traditional computational models, I argue that research inspired by Dynamical Systems theory can support an alternative view of representations. My suggestion is that we treat linguistic and representational structures as providing complex multi-dimensional targets for the development of individual brains. This approach acknowledges the indispensability of the intentional or representational idiom in psychological explanation without locating representations in the brains of intelligent agents.

Read more here: Explanation, Representation and the Dynamical Hypothesis