Why there is no general solution to the problem of software verification

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Abstract

How can we be certain that software is reliable? Is there any method that can verify the correctness of software for all cases of interest? Computer scientists and software engineers have informally assumed that there is no fully general solution to the verification problem. In this paper, we survey approaches to the problem of software verification and offer a new proof for why there can be no general solution.

Introduction

In the computer science and software engineering communities the problem of software verification is a central concern. Computer scientists have created various methods for at least partially checking the correctness of software. But could there be a fully general solution to the problem of verification? By a fully general solution we mean one that solves the verification problem for all cases of interest. Most computer scientists and software engineers have assumed as a working hypothesis that there is no such solution. In this paper, we demonstrate formally why this working hypothesis is correct.

The question of whether there is a general solution to the verification problem has two important aspects. The first is largely philosophical, in the sense that it concerns the limits of human knowledge. The second concerns the class of possible software verification methods. This issue lies within the domain of theoretical computer science. The verification problem can be solved for relatively small (where “small” is defined below) software systems for reasons that we will explain. We argue, however, that there are metalogical properties of the software verification problem that preclude a solution for all cases of interest.

The problem of software verification is relevant to epistemological questions concerning the role of computers in science. What degree of certainty are we entitled to expect of theories that depend in important ways on software? (See Boschetti et.al 2012). How does the kind of software intensive science that is currently ubiquitous differ in kind from non-software intensive science? (See Symons and Alvarado 2019).

The verification problem also has ethical and legal consequences in situations where we must decide how much care needs to be taken in military, governmental, and commercial contexts to minimize software
error. What level of software testing should we expect of a responsible manufacturer in cases where failure can lead to serious harms?

Error-free software in science and technology is ideal but as we will argue, we can never be certain that we have such software outside of a very restricted set of domains.

Our primary aim in this paper is to show (independently of the well known Halting Problem (Turing 1936)), why there cannot be a fully general solution to the problem of software verification. To do this, we first state the verification problem (Section 1.0). We then state several desiderata that a (fully) general solution to the verification problem should meet and critically examine possible solutions in light of those criteria. More specifically, in Section 2.0, we explain why the most widely used verification procedure, verification-as-testing, fails to serve as a general solution to the verification problem. We assess formal approaches to the verification problem, noting that the most widely used formal approach to verification, model-checking, has produced impressive practical results. In Section 3.0 we argue that, despite progress in verification methods, no software that is required to implement arithmetic, including virtually all business and scientific software, can be completely verified.

The arguments we present here are meant to close the door to a very specific kind of idealized philosophical ambition. We acknowledge that probably no practicing scientist in the software verification community has the goal that we show is impossible. Our argument does two things. First it provides a principled formal reason in support of the commonsense assumptions concerning the limits of verification. In the scheme of things this may be a less important contribution than our second point. Our work here takes an idealized vision of what is achievable via computational methods and software off the table. This is especially important for philosophical reflection on the role of computational methods in science and the ethics of technology. Given the result presented here, one cannot generally assume that we have, or that we can reliably create, error-free software. Thus, the ideal of achieving error-free software should simply drop out of epistemological and ethical reflections on computational methods.

1.0 The verification problem

The problem of assessing the reliability of software can be thought of as the problem of showing the correctness of a software system. For the purpose of this paper, we use the term “software” to mean a sequence of instructions written in a computer language (e.g., C++, Java, Ada, etc.). Understanding the reliability or correctness of a software system involves determining whether that system satisfies a specification. Among other things, a specification represents the purpose for which the software is being developed. In practice, specifications can be articulated with varying degrees of precision. Generally, the more precise the better. The problem of assessing whether the software system meets the specification is
called the *software verification problem*; from here on, we will refer to that problem more briefly as the *verification problem*. The verification problem, succinctly stated, is

*The verification problem.* Given a software system \( S \) and specification \( H \), determine whether \( S \) satisfies \( H \).

The satisfaction relation in this context can be articulated in model-theoretic terms.\(^1\) We will give a precise characterization of this relation in Section 3. An intuitive understanding of ‘satisfies’ will suffice for our immediate purposes.

There are a wide variety of ways that software can go wrong (See Floridi, Fresco, and Primiero 2015\(^2\)). Notice that our definition of the verification problem is minimal in the sense that it is not intended to rule out the system doing *more* than what we ask of it in the specification. There are cases where a piece of software behaves in ways not represented in \( H \) which would not count as errors on our minimal account. Doing more than the specification can be good or bad. For example, an operating system does more, and is intended to do more, than what is generally specified. Some unspecified uses of a piece of software can be benign, but others can be problematic. For example, a rootkit can allow an administrator access to a system, but the kit can also allow an adversary a backdoor into the system.\(^2\)

Our characterization of the problem restricts the challenge of verification to the determination of whether the system satisfies the specification. This is not meant to be an exhaustive list of necessary and sufficient conditions for the ways that things can go wrong in software engineering or in the deployment of technology. Rather, it is a necessary condition for determining the correctness of \( S \) that it at least satisfy the specification \( H \). By analogy, we can say that a functional heart is one that pumps blood throughout the body of an organism in a way that leads the organism to thrive. If it fails to do so, then we can say that it is not a functional heart. Whether the beating heart also has a pleasant sounding rhythm or can function as a symbol of romantic love is a not relevant to whether the heart is performing what philosophers of biology called its proper function (See for example Millikan 1989\(^3\)). Given our restriction we can characterize a necessary condition for software error as follows:

\begin{equation}
\text{(DE) An error in a software system S is a failure to satisfy H.}
\end{equation}

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\(^1\) Characterizing the satisfaction relation in the verification problem in model-theoretic terms may seem to differ from the way some computer scientists characterize verification. Emerson (2008, 28), for example, suggests the verification problem is determining “whether or not the behavior [our emphasis] of \( M \) meets the specification \( b \)” where \( M \) is the program and \( b \) is the specification. Our approach does not depend on behavioral properties, as such, of a program. Instead, we characterize the satisfaction relation in terms of a function that relates the models of a program/software system to models of the specification (see Section 3 for more detail).

\(^2\) The root toolkit example shows how difficult it is in practice to distinguish some specification from implementation issues. To put this point more sharply, we could answer the requirement to cut a piece of wood with a saw or a stick of dynamite. Both would do the job; the dynamite would surely cause much collateral damage.
Given (DE), (fully) verifying a software system $S$ is equivalent to showing that $S$ will not fail to satisfy $H$ in the sense of (DE).

Verifying software correctness requires using a method. What should such a method look like? First, we would like a method that scales well, i.e., a method whose complexity is no larger than “proportional to the size of the software system”. For example, the complexity of the method applied to a software system containing 200 “expressions” should be no greater than twice that of a software system containing 100 such expressions. We especially want to avoid situations in which the complexity of the method grows exponentially with the size of the software system. Second, we want a method that does not have to rely on lucky guesses or inspiration. Third, to help minimize the labor involved in the application of the method, it should be automatable. Fourth, we want the method to be able to handle the case in which more than one process is running at the same time since this is a feature of many modern software systems. Finally, we want a method that runs to completion in finite time (and preferably, in a time we care to wait).

To summarize, the following seem like reasonable features that we should expect from such a verification method. It should:

(D)$^3$

- (D1) Scale less than exponentially in problem “size”
- (D2) Not have to rely on “inspiration” when applied
- (D3) Be automatable
- (D4) Capture concurrency$^4$
- (D5) Complete its task in finite time.

Emerson 2008 (pp. 27 and 35) suggests some desiderata of adequacy that partially overlap (D3) and (D5) above. The criteria in Emerson 2008, however, are strongly (and in some particulars, exclusively) oriented to formal methods of verification (see Section 2.3 of the current paper).

In this paper, we show how the task of verification faces fundamental challenges in satisfying (D). To help explain these challenges, we survey existing approaches to the verification problem and draw some lessons. We emphasize that this survey (especially Section 3) provides only the level of detail required to

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$^3$ Collectively, D2, D3, and D5 significantly overlap what we mean when we say a verification procedure is algorithmic. In particular, an algorithmic procedure is an effective procedure, and an effective procedure by definition implies (D2), (D3), and (D5). One might, therefore, replace the union of (D2), (D3), and (D5) with a desideratum requiring an approach to verification to be algorithmic. Articulating (D) as shown, however, supports some informative distinctions among the relative strengths of approaches that have been taken to the verification problem, and for this reason we choose to adopt (D) in the more expansive form shown.

$^4$ Two programs, A and B, are concurrent if at least some portion of those programs execute at the same time.
support our general thesis. It does not, nor need it, given the arguments in Section 3, contain the kind of
detail that would typically be included in a comprehensive, general technical review of verification methods.\textsuperscript{5}

2.1 Verification and the Halting Problem

The theory of computation is the formal study of how computing systems compute. In order to ensure that
this objective is well defined, computer science requires a clear characterization of a computing system. For
the purposes of this paper we will restrict ourselves to the most widely accepted characterization of a
computer: the Universal Turing Machine. A Universal Turing Machine is regarded as the minimal system that
could serve as a general-purpose “computer” (Turing 1936; Boolos, Burgess, and Jeffrey 2007).

Given this interpretation of “computer”, we already know, in one sense, that a fully general algorithmic solution to the verification problem is not possible. Here’s why: Let $P$ be an arbitrary program running on a Universal Turing Machine and let $H$ be the requirement that $P$ should eventually halt. Stated as a verification task, the requirement can be framed as follows:

Given a software system $S$ ($P$ running on a UTM) and specification $H$ (tell whether $P$ halts),
determine whether $S$ satisfies $H$.

Turing proved that no algorithm can determine whether $P$ halts for \textit{all} possible program input-output pairs
for $P$ (Turing 1936). This result is known as the Halting Problem. Thus, for at least some cases, if the
specification $H$ contains a requirement that a software system halt, (D) cannot be satisfied for all cases of
interest. The Halting Problem assumes that a computer is a Universal Turing Machine. That assumption
excludes consideration of systems capable of implementing hypercomputation, which some authors have argued could or should be considered as a “computer”.\textsuperscript{6}

Modern general-purpose computing languages are \textit{Turing complete}, i.e., programs written in them are
equivalent to sets of instructions that can execute on a Universal Turing Machine. Such languages are
ultimately defined in such a way that they can fully describe anything a Universal Turing Machine can do.
The Halting Problem is a well-known limiting result that stands as one of the intellectual landmarks of
computer science. However, from an engineering perspective, one can imagine granting that the Halting
Problem is an insurmountable obstacle to verification while simultaneously regarding it as a special case that
can be ignored in practice. One might, for example, focus on the practical task of developing methods for

\textsuperscript{5} For a detailed survey of the latter kind, see Emerson 2008 and Clark, Bloem, Veith, and Henzinger 2018
\textsuperscript{6} Copeland et al 2016 make the case that hypercomputation should be taken seriously as a candidate for what is meant by
“computation”, given hypercomputation’s compatibility with the Church-Turing thesis. We will not defend our choice
to exclude hypercomputation in this paper, however see Davis (2004) for reasons to be skeptical.
determining whether a system satisfies a specification in the following way: One could simply stipulate that one is excluding verification tasks that involve the kinds of self-referential or meta-level features that characterize the Halting Problem. Restrictions of this kind are implicitly what happens in engineering practice. Naively, it might seem that once provably unachievable specifications have been ruled out, the verification problem is a straightforward testing problem. It turns out however, that verification-as-testing has intractable difficulties, albeit of a very different kind than the Halting Problem as we shall explain in following section.7

2.2 Verification-as-testing

In software engineering, most efforts to address the verification problem and minimize error involve testing. It might be conjectured that verification can be reduced to testing, but that view is deeply problematic.8 To see why, let S be a sequence of instructions written in some computer language L. The abstract executable structure of S can be represented as a control-flow-graph9 (Nielson, Nielson, and Hankin 1999; Baier and Katoen 2008). We define a path in a software system to be a path (Diestel 1997, p. 6) in such a graph. We define the path complexity of S to be the number of possible paths in that control-flow graph. Path complexity, thus defined, captures the space of possible ways that the software system could run to completion.10,11 The number of paths in a program increases at least exponentially with the number of conditional statements in S.12 Consider, for example, a 1000-line (instruction) software system that has a binary conditional statement every 10 lines on average. The number of paths through such a program, and hence its path complexity, is

\[ 2^{1000/10} = \sim 10^{30} \]

In general, the path complexity of a program of M lines that has a binary decision branch on average every N lines is \( 2^{M/N} \), where \( M > N \). We call this exponential scaling of the number of paths in S with the number of control (for our purposes, conditional) statements in S the path-complexity catastrophe; in

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7 This problem has been known, at least informally, since the earliest days of software testing.
8 Among philosophers, Jim Fetzer was the first to point out that software verification characterized as a testing problem poses challenges (Fetzer 1988) that are intractable in practice.
9 A control-flow statement in S is a statement that can, based on a condition that may not always obtain, change the order of execution of the statement in S.
10 Note that this definition requires that S can run to “completion”. Some software systems, such as operating systems, by design “run forever”, and thus have no “completion”.
11 This definition of path complexity is different from McCabe complexity, which is a count of the number of independent paths in S (McCabe 1976).
12 A conditional statement is a statement of the form “If X, do Y”. A Turing complete language, in addition to providing a way implement conditional statements, must also provide a way to implement loops. For the purpose of this paper, we can restrict the analysis to a program whose control statements are “if-then” statements only. Why? To show that verification-as-testing fails to satisfy (D1), it is sufficient to show that even if S contained only if-then control constructs, verification-as-testing would fail to satisfy (D1). (Accommodating loop control constructs in S only increases complexity.)
control-flow-graph terms, it is equivalent, for some software systems, to what is sometimes called the “state-
explosion” problem (Valmari 1998).

A 1000-line program is extremely short by contemporary standards. For example, it is not
uncommon for large scientific simulators to contain \( \sim 10^5 \) lines of code (Horner 2003). The UNIX/Linux
operating systems each contain at least \( \sim 10^6 \) lines of code. Facebook’s software system reportedly contains
\( \sim 61 \) million lines of code!

Why is high path complexity significant for verification-as-testing? One way to begin to answer this
question is to consider the degree of confidence we should assign to the results of a system. A natural way of
thinking about the appropriate degree of confidence we would give to these systems is in terms of their
reliability. We can be more confident in the behavior of a system if we can judge it to be reliable.

How can we determine the reliability of software systems through testing? In an empirical scientific
domain that uses no software (e.g., measuring the temperature of a material object, using only a simple (e.g.,
volumetric) thermometer, there is a relatively straightforward approach that an agent could take. Typically,
the distribution of errors (in the case of the thermometer, the distribution of errors presumed to be contained
in a set of measurements) in such a domain can be characterized by conventional statistical inference theory
(CSIT) (Hogg, McKean, and Craig 2005, Chaps. 5-12). CSIT requires us to randomly draw (Hogg, McKean,
and Craig 2005, Df. 5.1.1) a sample from the population of interest, then apply statistical tests to the sample
to assess the probability that a specific hypothesis (H) about the population holds. Often the sample size
required to test a hypothesis of interest in such a case is small -- on the order of 100.

In the case of a domain that uses non-trivial software in an essential way, however, we cannot, in all
cases of interest, be assured that CSIT can be used to characterize the distribution of error. It has been
shown (Symons and Horner 2017) that it is not possible to ensure, in all cases of interest, that the errors in a
software system are characterizable by random variables (for a definition of “random variable”, see Chung
2001, Chapter 3). CSIT requires distributions to be defined in terms of random variables, so we cannot, for all
software systems of interest, be assured that CSIT is applicable. It is always possible, furthermore, to extend
(perhaps unintentionally) any software system whose error distribution is characterizable by a distribution of
random variables to a software system the distribution of whose errors is not characterizable as a distribution
of random variables (Symons and Horner 2017).

We can imagine, of course, a testing regimen in which we exercise a software system S for some
period P of time, collecting error information (see, for example, Littlewood and Strigini 2000). That error
data can then be analyzed by CSIT (e.g., by statistical time-series analysis methods (Brockwell and Davis

\[^{13}\text{For a complete discussion of the path complexity catastrophe see Symons and Horner 2014.}\]
Let’s call this approach, appropriating a term from software engineering jargon, the “soak testing”14 approach to verification-as-testing.

There is much to be said for soak testing. The longer software is executed, it would seem, the more confident we can be that the software does what we want. In any case soak testing occurs as an inevitable consequence of using software after that software has been deployed.

Can soak testing overcome the problems of path complexity and the inapplicability of CSIT to the analysis of error in all possible software systems? It cannot. Here’s why. First, for a software system of sufficiently high path complexity (e.g., a typical program containing more than \(~10\) binary branches), soak testing can exercise, for the reasons argued above, only a (very small) subset of the possible paths in that system. Thus, soak testing cannot overcome the path complexity problem in all cases of interest. Second, note that the statistics obtained on the behavior of a software system are statistics about the set empirically observed behaviors during P. The mapping between these behaviors and the software proper cannot be fully characterized, for some software systems of interest, for exactly the reasons adduced above. Thus, for some software systems of interest, we have no warrant to infer the error distribution of the software from the statistics of the behaviors of those systems observed during soak testing. And therefore, soak testing cannot overcome the “CSIT inapplicability” problem for all cases of interest.

If we assume that verification is testing, and we cannot apply CSIT to testing, then in order to fully characterize the error distribution in a software system, we must test all paths in that system. But that approach is intractable. To get at least an informal sense of this problem, again consider the 1000-line program mentioned above. Suppose that we could test one path per second and that the program contained on average, a binary branch per 10 lines. Under plausible assumptions about the average time required to test a path in S, exhaustively testing all paths in such a program would take more \(~10^{13}\) lifetimes of the Universe to test all paths in the code (Symons and Horner 2017).

It might be objected to the above that the “path-complexity catastrophe” is largely determined by the relatively slow speed of human action or comprehension. One might imagine, such an objection might go, an entirely automated testing regime in which no human involvement is required.

Although it is difficult to discern what a test regimen completely devoid of human involvement could be (Turing 1950), let’s entertain the notion that there might be such a scheme. In that case, we note that the test regimen must nevertheless involve coordinated collecting of test results at a given point in space (Cover and Thomas 2006; Hennessy and Patterson 2007; Reichenbach 1957). That communication is speed-of-light limited (Reichenbach 1957). Let’s suppose, for example, that the average distance such communication must traverse is 1 meter, permitting us to replace the time to execute a test case in the analysis above to \((1/(3 \times 10^8 \text{ m/sec}) \sim) 3 \times 10^{-9} \text{ sec.}\) In this regimen, therefore, it would take “only” \((10^{13} \times 10^{-9} \sim) 10^4\) lifetimes of the Universe.

14 In typical practice, “soak testing” refers to informally observing the behavior of S over P under nominal operating conditions.
universe to test all paths in a non-trivial 1000-line software system. Thus, even if the time to execute a test case were limited only by speed-of-light communication, the path-complexity catastrophe would persist on speed-of-light scale.

To address this concern, it has been suggested that parallelizing tests (i.e., executing those tests at the same time) on a sufficiently large computer could, in theory, make the path-complexity catastrophe go away. However, even if this were a solution to the problem for some software systems, it is significantly limited for those software systems whose testing is state-history-dependent (e.g., large climate simulators), because the software sequences to be tested are not decomposable to anything smaller than a sequence that produces an entire system trajectory.

For at least some software systems, even maximally parallelizable testing cannot make the path-complexity catastrophe go away. Here’s why. The minimum time, $t_{\text{coord}}$, to coordinate at a given spatial location, P, the reports of tests executed in parallel at M disjoint spatial locations $x_1, x_2, \ldots, x_M$, is $\sim Md/c$, where

1. $d > 0$ is the mean of normally distributed one-way distances between P and the $x_i$, $i = 1, 2, \ldots, M$
2. $x_i \cap P = \emptyset$ for each i
3. $\emptyset$ is the null set (null region)
4. $c$ is the speed of light

(For a more detailed discussion, see Amdahl 1967). Note that for any $d$, as $M \rightarrow \infty$, $t_{\text{coord}} \rightarrow \infty$. Thus, no matter what value $d$ has, there is a positive lower bound to $t_{\text{coord}}$, and a corresponding upper bound on the path-complexity of some software system that can be tested in any finite time. This argument generalizes to the case in which there is merely some finite time – not necessarily determined by light time-of-flight -- required to coordinate results among M separate tests, provided $c$ is finite.

The software engineering community has long been aware that, with rare exceptions, only a tiny fraction of the paths in a typical software system can be tested. Accordingly, engineers try to design testing that shows that, at least under some nominal conditions, the system performs the most important functions required by H, and doesn't have at least some behaviors that violate H. In addition, practical testing may include (collections of) procedures that, at least taken as a whole, try to exercise every logical function (DeMarco 1979) in the system. This kind of testing is often called “coverage” testing. The statistics that can be obtained from coverage testing are, in effect, statements about which, or what fraction, of the logical functions in the system have been exercised.\(^\text{15}\) In a typical software system, there are often $\sim 10$ binary

\(^{15}\) Some variants of Linux, for example, contain a coverage-analysis utility, gcov.
branches per logical function, so “coverage” testing cannot overcome the path-complexity problem. (For a discussion of the scope of practical testing, see Amman and Offutt 2016).

In any case, verification-as-testing cannot satisfy at least (D1) and (D5) for all cases of interest. Given that testing cannot satisfy all of (D1)-(D5), computer scientists have pursued alternative verification strategies.

2.3 Formal methods of verification

What can be done to overcome the limits of verification-as-testing? It would seem that formal methods, roughly analogous to formal methods in logic (see for example Chang and Keisler 2012; Gries 1981) could provide purchase on the verification problem. Such approaches provide at least mathematically well-defined frameworks within which a variety of desirable meta-level properties (e.g., consistency and completeness) can be characterized by finite procedures. Is there some equivalent strategy for proving the correctness of a software system? There have been some impressive results in this program.

In this section, we sketch some examples of how the program of formal verification has been pursued. This overview closely follows Emerson’s 2008 retrospective and is not intended to be exhaustive or original. Our purpose here is only to introduce and illustrate some of the main achievements of the formal verification approach (for a fuller recent survey of these topics, see Clark, Bloem, Veith, and Henzinger 2018). We will argue that formal methods of verification variously meet at least some of (D1) – (D5) for at least some software systems. But ultimately, as we argue in Section 3.0, no verification method can satisfy (D5) for all cases of interest, and that result limits the detail that is proportionate to include in the more-or-less historical overview that follows (i.e., in Sections 2.3.1 and 2.3.2).

2.3.1 The “axiomatic” approach to formal verification

One way to formalize the verification problem is to cast it as a question about whether a given software system S is equivalent to a theorem in a theory, where that theory is formulated as a set of axioms that captures a specification H. In this paradigm, one manually constructs proofs of correctness for (deterministic) programs that start with an input and terminate with an output. To do this, a computer program is first translated into a set of sentences in the formal language L in which H is expressed. We then attempt to show that the resulting set of sentences has a proof in an axiom system (that determines H). This approach to formal verification is called “axiomatic” verification. Floyd 1967, for example, provided some basic principles for this approach by proving “partial correctness” in such a framework, as well as articulating

The Floyd-Hoare framework provided many useful insights. The approach facilitated the investigation of important meta-theoretic properties such as soundness and (relative) completeness, as well as compositionality. This framework, however, turned out to have limited utility in practice for several reasons (Emerson 2008, p. 29). First, the approach scaled exponentially in the number of terms in the theorems to be proven, thus failing to satisfy (D1). Second, the approach often required discovering, in non-mechanical (“inspired”) ways, proof strategies specific to the problem of interest, and failure to discover a proof did not imply that there was no proof possible, thus failing to satisfy (D2). Third, there was no known way to automate the approach, thus failing to satisfy (D3). Fourth, the framework could not express the temporal aspects of concurrent programs, thus failing to satisfy (D4).

Pnueli 1977 extended the Floyd-Hoare approach to capture least part of concurrency. Pnueli proposed, as a working hypothesis, that temporal logic could be used for reasoning about concurrent programs. To capture concurrency, he defined a temporal logic-based system that included as basic temporal operators F (sometimes), G (always), X (next-time), and U (until) (Emerson 2008, p. 30). Besides these basic temporal operators applied to propositional arguments, Pnueli’s system permitted nested and boolean combinations of subformulae (Emerson 2008, p. 31).

Like the Floyd-Hoare framework, Pnueli 1977 took an axiomatic approach to verification. Like the Floyd/Hoare approach, Pnueli’s approach cannot satisfy (D1) and (D2). Nevertheless, Pnueli’s incorporation of temporal logic into the formal description of software systems, it turned out, provided powerful resources for addressing (D4).

Temporal logic comes in two broad flavors (Emerson 2008, pp. 31-32, See also Venema 2001):

1. Linear Time Logic (LTL (Pnueli 1977))

   In LTL, an assertion h is interpreted by default to apply to a single path. (Here, “path” means a sequence of instructions that represents one way that a system could run.) When interpreted over a program there is an implicit universal quantification over all paths of the program.

2. Branching Time Logic (BTL)

   A liveness property asserts that program execution eventually reaches some desirable state (Owicki and Lamport 1982).

   Concurrent systems are often reactive systems (i.e., they execute in response to a stimulus (e.g., from a sensor) outside those programs). Reactive systems are often nondeterministic, so their non-repeatable behavior is not amenable to testing. Their semantics can be given as infinite sequences of computation states.

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10 A liveness property asserts that program execution eventually reaches some desirable state (Owicki and Lamport 1982).

11 Concurrent systems are often reactive systems (i.e., they execute in response to a stimulus (e.g., from a sensor) outside those programs). Reactive systems are often nondeterministic, so their non-repeatable behavior is not amenable to testing. Their semantics can be given as infinite sequences of computation states.
An assertion $h$ of a branching time logic is interpreted over computation trees. A branching time logic has a universal future-time quantifier $A$ (for all futures) and an existential future-time quantifier $E$ (for some future) paths. These quantifiers allow us to distinguish between AFP (along all futures, $P$ eventually holds and is thus inevitable)) and EFP (along some future, $P$ eventually holds and is thus possible).

One widely used branching time logic is known as Computation Tree Logic (CTL). Its basic temporal quantifiers are $A$ (for all futures) or $E$ (for some future) followed by one of $F$ (sometime), $G$ (always), $X$ (next-time), and $U$ (until); compound formulae are built up from nestings and propositional combinations of CTL subformulae (Emerson 2008, p. 32, See also Huth and Ryan 2004).

CTL and LTL do not have the same expressive power (Emerson 2008, p. 32). There is an ongoing debate as to whether linear time logic or branching time logic is better for formal verification objectives (Emerson 2008, p. 32).

One prominent logical framework familiar to logicians and that can capture CTL is the mu-calculus (Kozen 1983). The mu-calculus provides operators for defining correctness properties using recursive definitions and least fixpoint and greatest fixpoint operators. Least fixpoints correspond to well-founded or terminating recursion, and are used to capture liveness or progress properties asserting that something does happen. Greatest fixpoints permit infinite recursion. They can be used to capture safety or invariance properties. The mu-calculus is very expressive and flexible. It is still in wide use in formal verification methods (Emerson 2008, Section 4).

### 2.3.2 Model-checking

Casting the verification problem in a temporal logic does not, by itself, overcome all the problems faced by axiomatic approaches. Framing the problem in terms of temporal logic does nothing, for example, to address (D1) – (D3), and there is no guarantee that it would satisfy (D5). To help address these issues, Clarke and Emerson 1981 observed that if in contrast to the axiomatic approaches to proof of correctness, we derived a software system $S$ directly from $H$ we might be able to overcome at least some of the problems of the axiomatic approach. This proposal – formally deriving software from a specification – is often called the “synthesis” approach to formal verification of software.

The synthesis approach, as such, does not guarantee that (D1), (D2) and (D5) are satisfied. One way to help to meet (D1) and (D5) is to require that the description of $S$ define a finite state graph $M$. $M$ can then searched, via pattern specifications (which can be of arbitrary complexity), to determine whether $M$ satisfies $H$. 
Clarke and Emerson 1981 proposed, in particular, that we exploit the “small model property”\(^{18}\) possessed by certain decidable temporal logics. Exploiting the small model property of these decidable temporal logics has at least two further virtues: The method is sound: if the input specification is satisfiable, the method generates a finite global state graph that is a model of the specification, from which individual processes of \(S\) can be derived. The method is also complete: If the specification is unsatisfiable, it would be possible to determine that is unsatisfiable: given any finite model \(M\) and CTL specification \(H\) one can algorithmically check that \(M\) is a genuine model of \(H\) by evaluating (verifying) the basic temporal modalities over \(M\) based on the fixpoint properties. Composite temporal formulae comprised of nested subformulae and boolean combinations of subformulae of CTL could be verified by recursive descent. These features -- CTL, fixpoint properties, and recursion -- became the foundation of what is now called “model checking” (Emerson 2008).

How well does model-checking work? In practice, model-checking is typically implemented in a model checker. A model checker is a software tool that helps to assess whether a software system \(S\) is a model of a specification \(H\). Model checkers that are formulated in CTL can be quite useful in practice, especially when applied to finite-state concurrent systems. Moreover, CTL has the flexibility and expressiveness to capture many important correctness properties. In addition, a CTL model checking algorithm has reasonable efficiency: it is polynomial in the specification size (i.e., it satisfies (D1)).

The fundamental accomplishment of model checking has been the enabling of broad scale formal verification. Today many industrial-application systems have been verified using model checking. Model checkers have verified protocols with millions of states and hardware circuits with at least \(10^{50}\) states (Clark, Bloem, Veith, and Henzinger 2018).

For example, model-checking has been used to verify (Clark, Bloem, Veith, and Henzinger 2018)

- a cache coherence protocol
- the bus arbiter for the PowerScale multiprocessor architecture
- a high-level datalink controller
- a control protocol used in Philips stereo components
- an active structural control system to make building more resistant to earthquakes\(^{19}\)

For at least some programs, model-checking evidently satisfies (D1)-(D4). In addition, model checking supports both verification and refutation of correctness properties. Since most programs do contain

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\(^{18}\) A system \(K\) has the small model property if and only if any satisfiable formula in \(K\) has a “small” finite model, i.e., a model whose size is a polynomial function of the formula size.

\(^{19}\) The model checker used in this case found errors in the original design of the system. Some of these errors would have made buildings less resistant to earthquakes.
errors, an important strength of model checkers is that they can readily provide a counter-example for at least some classes of errors.

Despite its power, neither model checking nor any other verification method can satisfy (D5); the requirement that the method complete its task, in all cases of interest, as we now proceed to argue.

3.0 Can any method solve the verification problem for all cases of interest?

Model-checking satisfies (D1) - (D5) for at least some software systems. We will now argue that any software system that (a) is written in a Turing complete language and that (b) must implement at least Robinson arithmetic\(^{20}\) (Mostowski, Robinson, and Tarski 1953)\(^{21}\) has, as a consequence of the Löwenheim-Skolem theorem (Löwenheim 1915; Skolem 1920), an infinite number of non-isomorphic models and thus cannot be verified in a finite time,\(^{22}\) i.e., cannot satisfy (D5).

To show this, we posit that S can satisfy H only if every model of H is homomorphic to some model of S (where S is a software system and H is a specification).\(^{23}\) We call this condition “satisfaction up to model identity”. More formally:

\[(A) \quad S \text{ satisfies a } H \text{ up to model-identity only if each model of } H \text{ is homomorphic to some model of } S.\]

From (A), it follows that:\(^{24}\)

\[(Q) \quad A \text{ verification } V \text{ verifies that } S \text{ satisfies } H \text{ up to model-identity only if } V \text{ verifies that each model of } H \text{ is homomorphic to some model of } S.\]

Given (A) and (Q), we now argue that the Löwenheim-Skolem Theorem (LST; Löwenheim 1915; Skolem 1920) implies that no verification method can fully characterize the error distribution of a software system if the requirement to implement arithmetic is part of H:

\(^{20}\)Robinson arithmetic is “ordinary” (Peano) arithmetic without the Peano induction axiom.
\(^{21}\) Virtually all business and scientific software must implement arithmetic.
\(^{22}\) Note that a theory of arithmetic (or anything else) that is not finitely axiomatizable cannot be implemented on a finite Universal Turing Machine. No second-, or higher-, order theory of arithmetic, for example, can be implemented on a Universal Turing Machine. (See for example Chang and Keisler 2012, Chapter 1.)
\(^{23}\) To avoid a problem of self-reference one need only partition the specification into two components. One component would state the requirement for the relationship between the models of H and the models of S, and the other component would describe everything not included in or implied by the first component of the specification.
\(^{24}\) Although beyond the scope of this paper, it’s worth noting that criteria (A) and (Q) rest on a theory of verification that does not appear to be limited to software regimes as such, and thus might help to characterize verification in ordinary empirical science (and even more generally, in any regime in which verification must be accomplished by a multi-step procedure in finite time).
1. By (Q), in order to verify that S satisfies H up to model-identity, we must verify that every model of H is homomorphic to some model of S.

2. Let H include a requirement to implement a finite first-order axiomatization of at least Robinson arithmetic on a Universal Turing Machine. This requirement is implied by any requirement to implement arithmetic on a Universal Turing Machine. Note that, unless further qualified/constrained, the specifications of virtually all business and scientific software imply this requirement.

3. The LST implies that there are an infinite number of non-isomorphic models of any finite first-order axiomatization of Robinson arithmetic. Therefore, by (1), (2), and the LST, verifying that S satisfies H up to model-identity requires verifying that that each of the infinite number of non-isomorphic models of H is homomorphic to some model of S.

4. Now note that S is a sequence of computer language instructions created, at least in part, by the action of an agent who is at least in principle capable of making mistakes. Thus S is an attempt, and possibly a flawed one, to satisfy H. Because we cannot a priori presume any properties of S, we cannot be assured, for every case of interest, given that a model B satisfies H, that we can infer that B is homomorphic to a model of S except by verifying, in a distinct action, that B is homomorphic to a model of S. Such a verification activity takes some non-zero time.

5. For all models of H, let $t_{\text{min}} > 0$ be the shortest time required to show a model of H is homomorphic to a model of S.

6. By (3), (4), and (5), for at least some software systems, we must perform an infinite number of distinct verification actions to verify that S satisfies H up to model-identity. These actions will collectively take ($t_{\text{min}}$ times infinity $\equiv$) infinite time. Thus, we cannot verify in a finite time (D5) that an arbitrary S satisfies an arbitrary H up to model-identity.

On the basis of (1)-(6), we conclude that, even were the Halting Problem solvable, no verification method can satisfy (D5) for all cases of interest.

We now consider an objection to the view articulated in (1)-(6). It might be argued that in typical practice, the requirement that S satisfy all models of Robinson arithmetic, especially the class of models “involved in” the LST, need not be part of a specification “to implement Robinson arithmetic (RA)”. More specifically, the infinite class of non-isomorphic models considered in the known proofs of the LST are non-standard models of RA that require adding k new constants to the smallest signature of Robinson arithmetic.

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25 In practice, we would attempt to limit the range of such sequences to those that had passed some testing or formal verification regimen.

26 We thank a reviewer of an earlier version of this paper for this objection.
adding to that signature new elements as values of these new constants, then showing that there is a model for every finite subset of RA conjoined with the new sentences using these new constants. Some people might consider these non-standard models of RA to lie outside what we would typically mean by “Robinson arithmetic”.

Regardless of whether we admit non-standard models of RA in the scope of H, the objection continues, all models (including the non-standard ones invoked by the proof of the LST) of RA are elementary equivalent. By definition, two models, A and B, are elementary equivalent if they satisfy the same sentences (Chang and Keisler 2012, 32). Elementary equivalence seems like a plausible candidate of adequacy for the relation of the models of H and the models of S in a verification context. So suppose we replace “homomorphism” in the criterion, (Q), of adequacy with “elementary equivalence”, yielding

\[(Q') \text{ } A \text{ verification } V \text{ verifies that } S \text{ satisfies } H \text{ up to model-identity} \text{ if } V \text{ verifies that each model of } H \text{ is elementary equivalent to some model of } S.\]

Then in order to show that S satisfies (in the sense of (Q')) H, it would suffice to show that one model of H is satisfied by a model of S. Replacing (Q) with (Q'), therefore, allows us to escape the limit to verification posed by (1)-(6).

What can we say about this objection, which clearly goes the heart of the argument in (1)-(6)? To begin, we emphasize that a primary objective of our paper is to characterize the notion of software verification for all possible specifications. Achieving that objective could, and likely does, cause the characterization to include in the scope of possible specifications, creatures that might not be included in what passes as a “specification” in typical software engineering practice. Given these considerations, we argue that the objection articulated above is problematic for at least two reasons, depending on whether we take (Q) at face.

Problem 1: Assume (Q). Should standard models (in this case, of RA) to be included in the range of models of H? To this question, we reply that we know of no in-principle reason why a specification H must preclude requiring all possible models (here, of RA) to be included in the verification context. If non-standard models of RA are permitted to be included in the range of models of H, then there are an infinite number of non-isomorphic models of H that must somehow be satisfied by the models of S, (1)-(6) follows.

Even if non-standard models of RA are not permitted within the scope of H, there is a variant of (1)-(6) that would still carry:27

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27 We thank Troy Catterson for suggesting this elegant construction.
1. Any consistent extension of a model of RA is still a model of RA.

2. By Gödel’s Incompleteness Theorem (Gödel 1931), there is a formula G such that neither G nor \( \neg G \) is provable within RA.

3. Hence, both RA+G and RA+\( \neg G \) are both consistent extensions of RA.

4. Let M(G) and M(\( \neg G \)) be the models for both G, and \( \neg G \), respectively. G and \( \neg G \) are non-isomorphic.

5. Since both RA+G and RA+\( \neg G \) are extensions of RA, they have formulas that are undecidable within the respective systems.

6. Iterate the construction in (1)-(4) to create two more nonisomorphic models.

7. Repeat (1)-(6) a countably infinite number of times.

The result of this procedure is a countably infinite set of non-isomorphic models that contain all and only the natural numbers as the members of their domain, and they do not change the meaning of any of the relation predicates in the language of RA, i.e., all the models arising from this construction would be “standard”.

Substitute these models for the non-standard models, and suppress the invocation of the LST, in (1)-(6). A variant of (1)-(6), referencing only standard models of RA, then follows.

Problem 2: Don’t assume (Q). More specifically, why can’t we substitute “elementary equivalence” for “homomorphism” in (Q)? To this we reply that two cases are possible: either all the models of interest are finite or they are not. If all the models of interest of H and S are finite (Chang and Keisler 2012, 21), then elementary equivalence of the models of interest implies that those models are isomorphic (Chang and Keisler 2012, Proposition 1.3.19), i.e., there is a homomorphism between the set of models of H and some subset of the set of models of S. In this case, the difference between the homomorphism and elementary equivalence formulations of (Q) is moot. If some of the models of interest are not finite, then at least in some cases, elementary equivalence is too weak to preserve structure up to isomorphism (Chang and Keisler 2012, Exercise 1.3.4).

4. Conclusion

The most important implication of the results of Section 3.0 concerns the scope of software specifications, and more specifically, whether a specification that constrains “arithmetic” in a way could, if possible, make the specification satisfiable. The Halting Problem notwithstanding, all approaches to software verification considered above are tractable only for small software systems (nominally, containing fewer than 10 binary
branches). For example, there is no need for an ordinary thermostat system in a home to perform more than a very small set of operations, arguably requiring less than 10 binary branches. One could even imagine such thermometers operating with finite look-up tables for all the operations that they would need in order to satisfy a specification. Even in cases involving arithmetical operations, one could test a system that is required to perform that arithmetic in a small finite domain. It is highly unlikely, however, that restricting specifications for software along these lines will be acceptable in the scientific context or even in most internet-enabled products in a consumer context.

Understanding the trade-offs involved as we weigh the importance of verifying software correctness with the benefits of large-scale software are not matters that we ought to leave solely to engineers and corporate leaders. Elsewhere, it has been argued that philosophers need to carefully reflect on the nature of science when the reliability of our most important instruments is impossible to determine with confidence (Symons and Horner 2014; Horner and Symons 2014, Symons and Alvarado 2016). Perhaps more importantly, philosophers also need to reflect on the ethical implications of creating ever larger, more connected, systems with more layers of interdependence and vulnerability. Responsibility for failure is increasingly difficult to assign. The cost of detecting critical error can be impractically high and the consequences of failure to detect critical error can be lethal. In the Toyota unintended acceleration (UA) case (Koopman 2014), for example, we now know that verifying the as-built software is intractably difficult. At the same time, software systems like those in the UA case provide us with highly efficient and generally excellent cars. Is the loss of a handful of lives an acceptable price to pay for cars with more desirable features? How should one approach the risks associated with purchasing such a vehicle? What duty does the manufacturer have to explain the presence of error in its product? These are not questions that computer scientists or engineers are equipped to answer.

How do we balance our desire to be connected electronically to our toasters and toothbrushes, or to fill our homes with smart speakers/microphones/cameras with unverifiable and potentially serious vulnerabilities that these systems introduce in our lives and social systems? The first step in beginning to answer these questions involves understanding the limits of our ability to minimize error in these systems.

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