The policies and practices found at international borders result from a tangled and often conflicting variety of normative and pragmatic factors. In this essay we work to clarify the moral status of international borders and discuss the kinds of moral reasoning and related actions that people engage in relative to borders. While there are many different activities at borders, we focus on migration, due to the existence of a well-defined debate in moral philosophy and the wealth of anthropological evidence on the topic. We examine two absolute positions commonly found in moral and political philosophy, national sovereignty, and moral universalism, and then we explore the presence of more complex alternatives found in everyday border practices of border crossing and connections. From this, we develop the view that the current system of migration from poor to prosperous countries creates new kinds of relationships between people and thereby involves new patterns of moral obligation. A proper understanding of these obligations requires more attention to empirical phenomena at borders than is common in moral philosophy and political theory, bringing anthropology and related fields to the fore. We focus on the United States–Mexico border, the region where we work, but we bring in relevant material from other world regions; we believe that general implications can be drawn concerning the moral status of international borders more broadly. While we focus on ideas and practices about international borders, we place that in the wider moral economy of migration and group boundaries within and across societies (Fassin 2011).

We begin with a brief introduction to the existing literature on borders and migration in moral and political philosophy before turning to the social scientific evidence concerning moral views of various border issues. Through this, we offer a useful distinction between empirical border regions and the “border” imagined in the national interior. We then explore more deeply the various moral frameworks, sentiments, and practices by dwellers in national interiors toward migrants and border issues, activists drawn toward
the international border, long-distance migrants and migration law enforcers, and finally established border-region dwellers. We conclude by stating our own moral analysis that differs in important respects from the existing literature in philosophy and political theory, and that builds on various empirical observations in the preceding survey.

A DILEMMA AT THE HEART OF LIBERAL DEMOCRACY: MORAL AND POLITICAL PHILOSOPHERS ON INTERNATIONAL BORDERS

Although our inquiry centers on anthropology and related social sciences, it is helpful to survey the main positions in moral and political philosophy, and relatedly political theory, so as not to reinvent the wheel. These positions are not limited to scholars, but partially capture aspects of moral thinking and practice in various communities.

Territorially bounded geographical spaces in which people can legitimately exercise political agency have long been understood as a condition for the possibility of modern citizenship. However, transnational migration has posed a basic challenge to the idea of citizenship as a nonarbitrary and morally legitimate institution. Most obviously, the presence of migrants challenges egalitarian conceptions of citizenship and civil rights insofar as migrants are persons within the territory of some community who are to some extent or other not permitted to participate in the political decisions of that community. Seyla Benhabib aptly describes the philosophical problem as follows: “From a philosophical point of view, transnational migrations bring to the fore the constitutive dilemma at the heart of liberal democracies: between sovereign self-determination claims on the one hand and adherence to universal human rights principles on the other” (2004: 2).

Migrants have a more pressing stake in the future of their host countries than tourists or other temporary visitors. However, like tourists and other aliens, migrants are excluded, to varying degrees, from participation in political decision-making. The exclusion of migrants happens in virtue of their being born beyond the territorial boundaries of the state or by virtue of not having the specified kind of putative coethnic or familial relation to existing citizens. Thus, the border plays a central role in the system of exclusion and self-determination that Benhabib identifies as the constitutive dilemma at the heart of liberal democracy.

While not logically bound to political self-determination, and perhaps more variable for that reason, borders that enclose territories also affect various legal statuses, rights, and claims to societally distributed resources. Cara Nine (2008), for example, has argued for a Lockean defense of international borders, arguing that political communities have the right to exclude others from access to their resources. Open border policies, in her view, undermine the possibility for community self-determination. Her argument emphasizes the importance of sovereign self-determination, in particular the right to exclusion (thus justifying border and interior migration enforcement) by contrast with arguments for universal rights to transit and access.

By contrast, for philosophers who adopt some version of cosmopolitanism, the arbitrariness of international borders undermines their role in legitimizing exclusion. Charles Beitz (1999 [1979]) challenged the view that the sovereignty of states, as expressed in existing borders, trumps considerations of the universality of human rights. Later, Joseph Carens (1987) extended the argument from critiquing the moral
arbitrariness of borders to the view that we are obligated to have a system of open borders. Carens argued that freedom of movement is a more significant right than the right of a political community to exclude outsiders. We will refer to this strong position as “universalism.” In a more nuanced position, Benhabib (2004) and other cosmopolitans have argued against strict exclusion of migrants from membership in political communities and more specifically argued for a right to citizenship for aliens who have fulfilled certain conditions.

Arguments like Nine’s derive from assumptions concerning the effects of immigrants on the existing capacity for self-determination among natives. Whether it is the case that the rights of native populations are overridden in any significant way by a growing population of immigrants is, at least partly, an empirical question; indeed, perhaps the various effects of migration actually strengthen real capabilities for self-determination. Establishing the precise nature in which a member of the native population is harmed by the arrival of an immigrant might involve, for example, an understanding of the economic impact of migration, the advantages (if any) conferred on natives in a society that has a mix of citizens and immigrants, the emergent ties to the new society, and so on. The philosophical arguments concerning borders have, perhaps of necessity, been abstract and not directly engaged with the kind of empirical data that would settle such questions. Nevertheless, as we shall see, the anthropological study of borders is attuned to what Benhabib called a dilemma at the heart of liberal democracy.

The philosophical debate concerning the moral status of borders exhibits a variety of sophisticated variations on universalism and sovereigntism. These two poles form relatively clean conceptual opposites. Naturally, matters are not so simple in the daily lives of border people. Given that people do not act according to pure versions of sovereigntism or universalism, their moral reasoning around decision-making is a complicated matter. As we will see, folk cosmopolitanism and folk sovereigntism are often present and in tension simultaneously. Beyond that, we find in border life complex patterns of moral sentiments and reasoning that do not fit either model well, because they are more contextual than absolute; they emerge from relations between host society residents, migrants, and other border crossers. The important point is not just that such phenomena are complex, but that they derive from activities of creating and maintaining relations among persons that cross political borders and social boundaries. The existing universalist and sovereigntist philosophical and political-theoretical positions are in their nature too absolute, and thus discard the subtlety of moral ties and duties based on interactions within and across borders. We propose a sophisticated and powerful moral approach, as much of interest to philosophers and political theorists as social scientists, which arises from attending to how people connect to each other – which admittedly is varied and contradictory – and then generalizing a moral framework from this relational view. We find particularly suggestive evidence in the subtle quality of borderlanders’ reasoning about the realities of their home region, rather than the absolutes of the border imagined from a distance.

**Borders, the US–Mexico border, and the Border**

International borders play a variety of roles in political, economic, and social life. The multivalent quality of borders means that for some, borders are becoming more rigid
and salient, while others are finding them more permeable and less important. The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), for example, helped to create a US–Mexico border that is easier to traverse for privileged travelers, such as transnational managers, as well as for investments and commodities; while at the same time – and probably for connected reasons – it became harder to cross for Mexican workers and their families (Heyman 1999b; Nevins 2010). By reference to borders, then, some people inside the national territory are still envisioned and treated as outsiders, such as Mexican migrants within the United States or Africans in Europe, while others are envisioned and treated as unbounded, even though they have also crossed borders, such as prosperous white Europeans (Sasse and Thielemann 2005; Fassin 2011). Yet couching the matter in terms of wealthy and poor or white and nonwhite people is an oversimplification, given how a variety of nationalities, immigration statuses, and life experiences affect actual abilities to cross various international boundaries (e.g., Heyman 2004). Mobility is a key axis of social inequality in the contemporary world (Heyman 2009, 2010; Pallitto and Heyman 2008). As part of this, border regimes treat people differentially, a diversity that is shaped by and affects moral thinking about borders.

Likewise, there are multiple moral registers concerning the border, depending on just which specific border-crossing practice is involved. The anthropology of the morality of borders will thus differ depending on whether the matter at hand is cooperative management of a binational baseball team (Klein 1997), importing foreign consumer goods (Heyman 1997), used clothing smuggling (Gauthier 2007), and so forth. The distinction made by Abraham and Van Schendel (2005) between legal and illegal, and legitimate and illegitimate, is useful in untangling views of multiple border phenomena. Smuggling of certain consumer goods (e.g., fruits and vegetables or unprescribed medicines to the United States and household electronics and used clothing to Mexico) is illegal – and people are arrested or fined for it – but it is widely practiced and morally accepted by most borderlanders. Even human and drug smuggling are legitimate, in certain ways and in certain circles (Campbell 2009; Spener 2009). For example, Howard Campbell finds that many nonviolent roles in the drug-smuggling business are understood, with ambivalence, as morally acceptable forms of normal work aimed at livelihood for self and family. As Hastings Donnan and Thomas Wilson (1999) point out, borderlands often have “subversive economies” that challenge not only national economic regulations and monopolies, but also raise morally charged questions of sovereignty, legality, and legitimacy.

The variety of people and topics themselves are interesting, but we point to the wider fact that subtlety and diversity of experiences tend to emerge from border life. Much of this complexity and the moral recognition of it is local to border sites, reflecting the varied and deep ways that geographic proximity encourages intensity and multiplicity of border-crossing practices. This contributes to a borderlander perspective that tends to recognize, both in personal experience and in the experience of nearby others, a certain flexibility, diversity, ambiguity, subtlety, and depth to moral issues (Donnan and Wilson 1999; Long 2011). This proximal view contrasts with a commonly found distant one of borders as essentially simple. In this situation, people who live or work far from the border and have little or no direct contact with it, address it morally as an idea – often, a simple, unambiguous one – rather than as a messy and quotidian site of experiences and activities, which we call “the border.”
A wider generalization of this idea would extend to people with experience with border-crossing processes of various sorts, such as immigrant community relationships or international residence in personal backgrounds, even while having a current location deep in the national interior. The point is not just the geography, then, but the implication of boundary-crossing experiences and practices on moral imagination.

This proximate–distant contrast overlaps with—but is not identical to—a distinction between the border as a practice and the border as a symbol. Border practices are diverse, as illustrated just above, and border settings also are diverse. An unauthorized laborer, violating a temporary border-shopping card to clean houses in El Paso, is likely to be looked on as more licit by borderlanders than an unauthorized migrant in a remote desert setting, but both are viewed with more suspicion than a documented, wealthy Mexican doing business at an El Paso bank. As a result, proximal practices are morally plural and often shaded.

By contrast, the border as a symbol of the sovereign, territorial polity and its role in various public imaginaries of outside versus inside (again, the border) tends toward the singular and unified. In this view, border crossings are either legal and right or illegal and wrong. Or more strongly—in symbolic reasoning above and beyond formal legalism—the inside of a border is good and safe, the exterior bad and threatening. The symbolic view still entails major differences of moral evaluation (e.g., the border may symbolize either sovereignty or universal human rights) but it leaves less space for recognition of diversity of persons and activities, and ambiguity and subtlety of moral issues on the ground. It is more reified, in keeping with the simplification process of state logic (Scott 1998). The border operates as a powerfully evocative, highly condensed, singular symbol, while border-crossing experiences and persons act and think in morally diverse ways.

Border symbolism is more prominent at a distance from actual international borders. Nevertheless, it exists in border regions also. Furthermore, border symbolization helps shape immediate border practices. For example, it drives US boundary enforcement operations. In turn, this creates practices that are enacted at immediate border sites by a socially significant group, central government employees. Distant border symbolism also forms a point of reference and response by local borderlanders, either using such symbols in their own moral discourses and practices, or reacting against what they see as oversimplification and misunderstandings by interior dwellers.

In this essay, we focus primarily on the US–Mexico border and related interior processes in the United States, due to the richness of the material and our personal expertise. However, related phenomena occur throughout the world of migration and border control, such as Europe’s “Schengenland” zone of free internal movement and heavily controlled external entry (Andreas and Snyder 2000; Houtum and Pijpers 2007; Houtum 2010), and we make reference to this work as appropriate. Likewise, our key US–Mexico border theme of differences in moral evaluation between borderlanders and interior dwellers is paralleled throughout the world, where borderlanders sometimes identify more with the border region than the core, and more generally by borderlanders’ incomplete regard for national institutions, rules, and categorizations (Flynn 1997; Wilson and Donnan 1998; Ishikawa 2010; but see Grimson and Vila 2002). Similarly worldwide is the use of borders as symbols of moral distinction and the us-versus-them comparison (Donnan and Wilson 1999). Many, though not all, border-related moral phenomena are captured in our case material.1
We proceed in the subsequent sections by characterizing, first, some moral attitudes and practices among geographically distant groups, then groups that move from the interior to act directly at the border, and finally border-near groups. We seek to use cases where there is anthropological research, but also include some items that are insightful if not ethnographic. We conclude by suggesting that cross-border practices, including migration, challenge narrow definitions of membership in favor of more complex, multistranded notions of relationship and membership in the contemporary world. This is a different sort of pro-migrant moral stance than universalism, and is something that rises out of the anthropological engagement with ideas and practices on the ground.

**Borders and Interiors**

Broadly, we argue that the moral reasoning about borders by residents of interior locations tends toward externalization and simplification of complex debates over national membership brought about by transnational migration, intertwined with internal racial-ethnic inequalities. Positions tend toward absolutes, mainly restrictive sovereignty but, among dissenting voices, also strong universalism. However, border sites and actors are scattered throughout national interiors, not just found at land and sea margins, and we will consider these important hybrid sites.

Untangling interior US perspectives on external borders, in particular the US–Mexico one, is difficult. The anthropological source material is uneven, emphasizing arm’s-length analyses of commodified discourses (media and political), and there are few ethnographic case studies that touch on this subject, despite its clear societal prominence. Leo Chavez (2001), for example, analyses US magazine covers addressing the topic of immigration, and relies similarly on media discourse evidence in a more general book of essays (Chavez 2008; also see Santa Ana 2002). He finds that images of immigration in general include positive as well as fearful evaluations; in particular, he notes the persistence of the US tradition of seeing immigrants as striving for a better life (ideologically, an “American” one). However, this positive discourse is receding in favor of a fearful image of poor and culturally strange invaders, racialized as Mexicans. Images of the US–Mexico border mainly show threats, such as long columns of Mexican-appearing male figures penetrating like arrows into the United States, crowds of impoverished families surging northward (emphasizing the reproductive symbol of women with children), and the region as fractured or chaotic. He also suggests, and Dorsey and Díaz-Barriga (2010) confirm, that visual media images represent the border as empty, remote, and inhuman terrain, with lonely enforcers and surreptitious violators, by contrast with how borderlanders experience and envision it as a populated, diverse, and often urbanized, landscape.

Interwoven with these themes about Mexican migrants is a “security” discourse about borders, especially the Mexican border: that is, borders are the prime passage through which threats to security come from outside in, and thus key locations for defeating these threats (Heyman 2008). Huysmans (2006) and Pratt (2005) cover parallel material on securitization and risk discourses applied to migration and borders in Europe and Canada respectively. While there are indeed, internationally and domestically, genuine human security threats, their moral framing in the wealthy countries of the world displaces the security agenda away from empirical causes and sites of
occurrence (e.g., postcolonial, geopolitical struggles) and toward laboring, culturally “othered” migrants (e.g., for the US–Mexico border, see Heyman and Ackleson 2009). This expansive and slippery notion of security – in particular, the notion of a purely safe inside and a distinctly threatening outside (including outsiders within) – is crucial to sovereigntist reasoning that denies the moral weight of actual flows, connections, and relations.

As provocative as discursive analyses are, they decode isolated representations (e.g., Chavez’s magazine covers), and there is a notable lack of ethnography directed toward the production and reception of such discourses (Heyman 2001a). This is a major need in the anthropology of moralities about borders. There is little ethnographic study of a variety of sectors involved in framing discourses and moral evaluations: media producers, security bureaucracies, politicians, business organizations, labor unions, funders, religious hierarchies, national level advocacy organizations, and migrants themselves. Of course, we have reams of their public products (e.g., in Nevins 2010); what is missing is ethnographic study of the processes within and between these sectors (however, concerning the US–Mexico border wall, see Maril 2011, and for European migration control, Feldman 2011). Moral attitudes from a distance do not just exist as such, but are produced, reproduced, challenged, and transformed.

Interior site case studies of reception of migrants and tensions between migrants and hosts do offer provocative hints about how moral displacements of local migrant–host interactions to the border occur. Heyman (1998) argues that immigration presents a moral challenge of mutual interaction between hosts and migrants (often, however, complex and indirect). He suggests that it can either grow into mutual recognition and obligation or be “bordered” through social and moral mechanisms of distance and othering. He then proposes that distancing responses have not only an interactional and discursive component, but also a spatial one: keeping out the envisioned risky, bad, or different others, through the use of sovereignty at borders, both national and local. As plausible as this analysis seems, ethnographies of host–immigrant relations in the United States do not touch on how people talk about and act politically on borders and migration policy beyond the local setting (see, e.g., Lamphere 1992; Millard and Chapa 2004; Zúñiga and Hernández-León 2005; Massey 2008). Yet the broader policy analysis literature and public opinion literature suggests that such displacements are indeed important (see Gilot 2007; Nevins 2010; Segovia and Defever 2010).

Host populations often have reduced contact with new migrants outside of the commodity relation (employment). Often, even employment is indirect (purchase of services from a local business that in turn uses migrant labor). In this reduced contact situation, the focus often is on large groups of single male laborers, or to a lesser but still important extent, women with young children. This is by contrast with richer, more multidimensional relations with individuals and families who have established longer-term residence and have to some extent climbed the occupational status and income hierarchies, that result in favorable or at least ambivalent moral evaluations. The former migrants (single males, new families, occupationally lower groups) in fact may be crucial to the local economy, but they are often seen as outsiders allowed to enter through a failed border. This is supported by Inda’s (2006) nonethnographic discourse analysis of Latino migrants as antisocial beings in the US postsocial formation. This morality, it is important to say, contains within itself a contradiction that has not been explored by scholars, between the positive evaluation of hard work
and economic contribution and the moralized fear of the laborers themselves (criminal, dirty, diseased, etc.).

In the current US racial hierarchy, Latino migrants are the most stigmatized group in reports of local immigrant–host relations. The diversity of Latino migration, in terms of source countries and legal status, is reduced to an image of illegal Mexican aliens, as evidenced by several instances of violent attacks on non-Mexicans by persons shouting anti-Mexican phrases. Chavez (2008) refers to this as the “Latino threat narrative.” Its roots lie in enduring US imperialist relations with Mexico (and to a smaller extent, the Caribbean), defending the symbolism of domination (involving the southwest border, of course), as well as skin color racism. It draws on the salience of Mexicans as the largest and thus most representative group of new immigrants to the United States. The border then becomes a dominant trope in the United States for new Latin American migration, and then for migration issues in general. Borders are not in imagination and practice (e.g., the US wall is only on the Mexican line) posed equally against all groups, but rather according to specific societal boundaries of race, class, and gender (Lamont and Molnár 2002; Fassin 2011).

This is seen in the profusion of border-like sites in the national interior, as well as at outer frontiers. Characteristic locations include international airports (which are, of course, borders and sites of sovereignty), other transportation sites, and various aspects of interior policing, especially when interconnected with national immigration policing. While increasingly studied in the United States (see especially Coleman 2007, 2009), the literature most attentive to the moral dimensions of these sites and practices comes from Europe, and especially France (Fassin 2001, 2005; Fassin and d’Halluin 2005; Ticktin 2006; Kobelinsky and Makaremi 2008; Richard and Fischer 2008; Makaremi 2009). Two themes emerge in this work. One is the complex and changing moral agenda of exclusion and inclusion, shifting for example from positive moral evaluation of strong, mostly male working bodies to negative evaluation of them. Relatedly, there has been a change toward a positive evaluation of suffering (ill, injured, persecuted) bodies but an exclusion of other bonds, such as residence, work, marriage, parenthood, and so forth. The other, connected to the re-evaluation of suffering, is involvement of humanitarian advocates and measures in the overall process of migrant exclusion and expulsion. Despite the ambivalent presence of formal legality and humanitarian exceptionalism, the overall trend is toward more intensive and more widely distributed systems of exclusion.

So why do we witness these widely distributed policies of exclusion, the so-called “wall around the West,” which occurs in other settings as well (Andreas and Snyder 2000)? A particular kind of symbolic and moral reasoning separates members from outsiders in various performances of the border. We start with Mary Douglas’s (1966) classic work on the symbolism of external boundaries. External boundaries of many kinds (bodies, homes, nation-states, etc.) represent who and what are understood to belong, in various roles and spaces. Items (people, substances, ideas, and symbols) that cross boundaries are unusual in some way, either symbolically powerful or dangerous, or both. Impurity and pollution are conceptualized as elements belonging properly to one side of a symbolic-spatial boundary. Having crossed over to the other side, they violate the proper categorical order. However, this sort of reasoning can be applied to many boundaries in social life, and it has many potential valences. Boundary crossers can have unusual sacredness and power, not just danger and risk.
Unquestionably, an important factor focusing boundary symbolism on international border sites is the pervasive and powerful territorial frame, both discursive and material, of the modern state (including its recent reworkings, such as immigration zones in the European Union), whose rise to centrality is diagnosed by Nevis (2010). It reinforces extremes in moral thought: most notably, borders are a strong symbol of the outer limits of membership, citizenship versus outsiders, of safety inside a womb-like arrangement, as seen in the US–Mexico border wall. But the simplifying logic of border symbolism can be reversed; smaller constituencies see borders as symbolic gateways outward, expressions of moral universalism.

Chavez (2008: 10–15) convincingly argues that border and migration discourses address membership: who is contained inside, and who is outside; who is a citizen (and in what senses: legal, practical, cultural, and so forth); what is a national identity and what is not; and who is and should be a member of the collectivity (for European parallels, see Anthias and Yuval-Davis 1992; Silverstein 2005; Fassin 2011; Palidda 2011). The ethnographic literature reports these moral membership debates from sites in national interiors, concerning issues such as schools, housing codes, police stops, and so forth. In these sites, however, such lines are made ambiguous by the dense web of interactions between migrants and hosts. The border then, imagined and politically practiced at a distance (the boundary with Mexico) or in isolated detention and removal sites, is a crucial simplifying move, giving “order” to ambiguous membership. In fact, ongoing relations cut across actual borders just as much—they are transnational—and thus such sites are also morally complex, but this not what largely occurs in interior opinion formation, mass media representations, or politics and policy.

FROM DISTANCE TO PROXIMITY: ACTIVISTS AT THE LAND BORDER

Here, we focus on people (other than agents of the state) who act primarily and directly on their moral convictions about the border: “Minutemen” and border humanitarians. The Minutemen are volunteers who act as if they were border guards, placing themselves near the border, detecting people on the move, and placing calls to the Border Patrol, though they have no powers of arrest. The humanitarians carry out varied activities to aid migrants, an example of which is stocking water in the desert to help unauthorized entrants from dying of hyperthermia on their dangerous hike northward. Both groups thus go beyond imagining the border to practical action on it. But at the same time, the moral reasoning involved is relatively simple and pure: the border is in one case a location threatened by illegitimate invasion of nonmembers; in the other, it is an illegitimate barrier to universalism. They are also transitional geographically: many of their members come from the national interior to the border—some do originate in the border region—with the goal of acting at this specific moral site (more humanitarian activists are long-term border residents while more Minutemen are outsiders).

Accounts of the Minutemen are not ethnographic; they are based on documentary research on key members (e.g., Holthouse 2005), secondary analysis of journalistic accounts (Chavez 2008: 132–151) and an interesting opinion survey of both
Minutemen and humanitarian activists (Cabrera and Glavac 2010). From these reports, they have a strongly felt, highly distilled sense of threat to enclosed membership. The US government has, in their view, failed to protect the territorial boundary adequately, the entity that delineates and guards this membership from unauthorized claimants. Their degree of racism is debated (in a politically correct society, racism can be displaced onto criticisms of the migrants’ lack of legal status), but the Latino threat narrative is certainly present. We have seen these themes in a more diffuse way in the US interior; what is striking in this case is the drive to purist moral rectification, and the entrepreneurial moral volunteerism involved.

There are a number of ethnographic studies of border humanitarian activists, many of whom, though not all, are religiously motivated (Cunningham 1995; Doty 2006; Hondagneu-Sotelo 2007, 2008; Dunn 2009; Heyman et al. 2009). Broadly, the activists express and act on a moral skepticism of borders. A telling example is Hondagneu-Sotelo’s (2008: 133–169) description of a religious ritual (the Posada sin Fronteras) which protests against deaths in unauthorized border crossing. This uses the border precisely as the setting of ritual negation of current migration policies. She terms this “Christian antiborderism”; it could also be termed Christian universalism, with a sacred vision of the human in God’s image set against the nation-state. Likewise, Doty’s (2006) study of Humane Borders, a coalition with both religious and secular members, identifies their moral action, helping migrants survive the desert, as acting precisely against the normalized, deadly political-social order. Secular forms of universalism also motivate some activists; Dunn’s (2009) study of El Paso, Texas activism in the 1990s identifies in the Border Rights Coalition a philosophy of universal human rights that broke with citizenship viewed as strong but bounded rights.

Interestingly, the Minutemen and humanitarian activists both hold critical attitudes toward dominant patterns of globalization (Cabrera and Glavac 2010). Both are critical of the North American Free Trade Agreement, for example, and further proposals to create a Free Trade Agreement of the Americas. Both insist on a moral vision against the amoral, power- and profit-driven agenda of the dominant political-economic order. That dominant agenda values specific capital, commodities, and people who are free to cross borders, denies the value of others, and ignores alternative visions of either national or global communities. The two groups differ, however, in that humanitarians favor free trade agreements with cross-border labor and environmental protections, as well as arrangements for the free mobility of labor, while the Minutemen disapprove of such measures. The Minutemen target the border in order to reinforce national unity and closure; the humanitarians target it in order to move toward globalization of human membership and related rights.

In both cases, the borderline becomes the physical symbol for moral positions and actions. These issues – migration, free trade, and so on – are, after all, matters of whole societies and indeed transnational orders. The border is merely a passageway; it does not cause those phenomena. Borders help to delineate relevant entities – in this case, the sovereign territorial state, and its patterns of membership – but relevant entities are only part of the interconnected totality. But in the moral imagination, the border stands in for the totality. This is a problematic simplification of borders and their relation to wider processes and places.
Processes of vast scale such as transnational migration bring face to face, in the border setting, people with contrasting moral perspectives on the same activity, such as unauthorized migrants and border enforcers (Heyman 2000). Unauthorized migrants, going from the interior of Mexico to the interior of the United States, experience border crossing as a passage of considerable uncertainty, danger, and expense. They are aware of their categorization in the United States as “illegal” (though they may understand little of the actual laws and penalties), but also as desired by US employers as well as by friends and families. In this context, Sandell (2009, 2010) sensitively elicits migrant and migrant family perspectives. They recognize as an external reality the various categorizations, barriers, and risks, but give this no moral recognition as orderly, right, or meaningful. They view migration as a practical necessity, part of a lifeway centered on crafts of survival; their own local moral orders build on age, gender, kin relations, religion, land, house, and so forth. The practical logic of migration thus impels people into morally incomprehensible and tragic encounters with domination, including border crossing.

Heyman’s (2000) ethnography with US border enforcement officers addressed both those who had grown up in proximity to the border and those from the US interior who moved to the border region because of this employment. He examines their immediate reasoning within a wider public policy context driven in part by distant moral frameworks discussed above. Unsurprisingly, he found that bureaucratic legality and orderliness was a central value, which unauthorized migrants violated, but also found a paradoxical identification with the needs of migrants to seek to work in the United States. This poses a key moral dilemma, the distillation at the point of action of the society’s wider moral contradictions. One solution is to distinguish among unauthorized migrants between “good” (but still arrested) workers and a smaller group of dangerous border crossers (e.g., criminals, drug smugglers). The latter serve to justify the contradictory treatment of the former, as “you never know who you will catch.” Otherwise “innocent” (in this view) labor and family migrants are admitted to be human (they are largely not dehumanized), but are considered a lower order of people, outsiders who are now out of place. Higher kinds of people are insiders, citizens, among whom border officers counted themselves. Insiders have complex abilities to choose and act, and deserve respect; migrant-outsiders are one-dimensional beings, with simple motivations and moral characters, who upon being apprehended and processed should abandon their volition and obediently follow the imprisonment and expulsion process. While this moral stance broadly justifies the practical needs on the part of a police force, it is also a moral model for construing the border as a line between members and outsiders, dominant and subordinate (parallels can be found in Europe: see Spire 2008; Hall 2012).

**Borderlanders**

Our central argument is that the kernel of a new moral framework for migration and other boundary-crossing flows emerges from observing border experiences. The
border material (Martínez 1994; Vila 2000; 2005; Heyman 2001b, 2010) is varied and contradictory; that complexity and fluidity is, in fact, part of our argument. First, borderlanders are diverse. There are both Mexican and US-side borderlanders, although there is a substantial population of transnationals (Mexican citizens, say, living in the United States, but commuting to Mexico to work, etc.). Likewise, there are many lines of division within these broad categories: citizenship and legal status, race, class, gender, age, and personal value choices. This makes generalization more difficult, but points to the penetrability and ambiguity of the boundary line to borderlanders.

Mexican borderlanders, following Vila (2005), identify themselves by a series of contrasts. They consider themselves morally superior to North Americans, as having human values, caring family bonds, and so forth. Mexicans, border and otherwise, regard their northern border as essentially illegitimate (stolen territory) and US border enforcement as unjust and hypocritical with respect to US use of migrant labor (e.g., Heyman 1999a: 304). But they also view the border positively as a site of connection with US public safety, prosperity, and modernity. Mexicans, then, have a subtle and complex moral evaluation of cross-border relations.

Vila divides US borderlanders into several ethnoracial groups, and then subdivides people of Mexican origin into recent immigrants and generationally deep Mexican Americans. The latter are a useful example for our purposes, making up the majority of US border communities except San Diego. They tend to offer negative narratives about the present-day Mexico side – it is corrupt, it is poor, it is dirty – mixed with positive narratives about an idealized Mexican past. This draws strong moral boundaries, with Mexican Americans self-identifying as US members, not transnational Mexicans. But it also resists dominant Anglo-American stigmas viewing them as permanent outsiders (the Latino threat narrative). At the same time, such Mexican American borderlanders (and some, but fewer, Anglo- and African American borderlanders) frequently cross the border, including legal visiting and shopping, and in some cases petty smuggling. Employment of unauthorized workers (domestics, gardeners, etc.) who commute from Mexico is widespread and morally tolerated by all ethnoracial groups (Heyman 2009). All of these border-crossing relations are regionally legitimate. US borderlander evaluations, then, are complex, ambivalent, and situational.

Fundamentally, borderlanders from both sides have practices, personal and official/business relationships, and broader sorts of knowledge (i.e., storytelling and listening) that bring the geographic proximity of the boundary to bear on moral evaluation of the border (also see Long 2011). The border is, first off, intimate, a part of the self-identity, which includes to some extent the nation on the other side, even when people are critical of it. Second, it is recognized as complex, nuanced, and ambiguous: not a single divider of inside/outside but a locus of many different possible people and acts, with diverse evaluations. Third, sentiments in the region oscillate constantly between sympathy with borderlanders of the other side and tension with them; even tensions and differences are not permanent and absolute. Fourth, borderlanders often feel alienated from the national interior, even when they broadly identify as members of the nation state. They criticize reductive discourses from the interior for their lack of subtlety. Finally, borderlanders often view crossing and penetration of the boundary as normal, offering complex and situational evaluations depending on particular
circumstances. Borders are reasonable and acceptable – theirs is not moral universalism – but the morally reasonable version of borders is that they are places for interaction and transit, as well as some regulation and closure. Membership is understood to involve complex, transnational gradations, widely encountered in this region. Membership, then, is not absolute, but interactive and situational.

CONCLUSION

Whether in moral philosophy, or in the public discourse of national interiors, borders are often treated in reductive and absolute manners. In moral and political philosophy, cosmopolitans critique borders as barriers to shared humanity, while for sovereigntists, borders are fundamental to defining membership in delimited political collectivities. However, the practices and ideas of borderlanders, admittedly incoherent, point to a different approach.

The borderlands setting focuses attention on activities and interactions that occur because of the personal and collective uses of moving, cutting across, and combining differences. At the same time, borderlanders recognize distinctions and conflicts. Our view is that moral decision-making with respect to border-related phenomena, such as transnational migration, should start with relationships in practice, and then build toward mutual moral recognition (Heyman 1998). The kinds of interactions include work/employment, trade, education, family and friendship relations, and so forth. Such relationships often emerge by historical accident, but over time they form general webs of connectedness. Being tied to other persons does and should impose a set of correlated obligations on their participants. While arguably all humans should have fundamental moral equivalence, in practical terms the persons to whom we owe moral equivalence are the ones with whom we have active relations. This is particularly the case in transnational migration, where morally important interactions occur between migrant and host. This is neither bounded by preexisting nation-state membership nor is it just a theoretical global equivalence between people who do not actually have relations. Seen as an emergent moral framework, relevant agents, duties, and moral goods begin to be defined.

Our ethical stance, then, turns away from absolutes. We begin with observations on the moral relationality and sensitivity to context often found empirically in borderlands ethnographies, but seek to develop out of that a more generalizable framework. We are not advocating complete flexibility. Instead, we argue that moral obligations are grounded in close analysis of relationships, and that if we create relationships (as prosperous societies do with transnational migrants), we cannot escape moral obligations. Likewise, we build on the border experience, where crossing, interactions, and bonds occur across lines of social differentiation, such as international boundaries. Such emergent relations should be recognized and valued, and should entail steps toward inclusion in membership.

Such a view does not entail the rejection of international borders as such. Borders have a place in the contemporary world, as ways to conduct collective activities and regulatory mechanisms. Concretely, for example, borders are helpful places to intercept international gun smugglers or terrorists. However, we resist the move from this sort of modest practical value toward morally arbitrary conceptions of absolute
group membership. Instead, discourse on international borders requires the interplay between clear moral principles and careful empirical consideration of transnational relations that emerge over time. To do that requires thinking on the border between moral and political philosophy and the social sciences.

NOTES

1 One important theme that we capture only partially is borders as morally loaded symbols of lost or stolen lands, sovereignties, and identities, as represented by Ireland (Donnan and Wilson 2010) and Israel–Palestine (Bornstein 2002). Such issues in fact have happened at the US–Mexico border. On the US side of the border, ethnonational irredentism by Mexicans in territories seized by the United States in the Mexican–American War of 1845–48 declined after the failure of several attempted revolts at the end of the nineteenth century, in favor of internal US struggles for immigrant and racial civil rights. On the Mexican side of the border, this moral meaning is still alive, partly because of nationalistic education in schools (of course, US education is equally nationalistic: Rippberger and Staudt 2003). While this topic informs our understanding of Mexican migrants and borderlander views of the United States, its role at the present is modest.

2 For reasons of space, we have skipped over important elements of variability, including the geographic site of host–immigrant relations, race and ethnicity, class, gender, and personal moral perspectives (discussed later in the essay).

3 Not all activists fit these generalizations; the more pragmatic political wing discussed by Heyman et al. (2009) holds similar values but engages in different moral practices, working within the existing nation state and border frame.

4 The border enforcement system does, however, contribute to the death of unauthorized migrants. Direct action (Doty 2006) addresses this issue.

5 We do not view the humanitarians as morally equivalent to the Minutemen, since they hold very different views of and actions toward their fellow humans. We just point out some structurally parallel features of their moral thinking and practice.

6 This view is supported by David Spener’s (2010) interpretation of the migration/smuggling (coyotaje) process as movidas rascuaches, a difficult term to translate but approximately “creatively absurd maneuvers.” Rascuache points to tacky or strange bricolages done by the poor and powerless. Movida is a hustle, a way of surviving and thriving.

7 Vila’s work was done before the terrible outbreak of widespread violence in Mexican northern border cities. We do not have an account comparable to his for the contemporary situation.

REFERENCES


