Posts Tagged ‘Philosophy of Mind’
Computing with bodies: Morphology, Function, and Computational Theory (with Paco Calvo)
Computing with bodies forthcoming in Charles Wolfe (ed.) Brain Theory: Essays in Critical Neurophilosophy
Read MoreThe emergence of systematicity in minimally cognitive agents
Emergence of systematicity corrected version
Read More“Beyond Error Correction” Frontiers in Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2012.00423 September, 2012 (with Paco Calvo and Emma Martin)
Available here
Read MoreThinking about Pain in Hell; Identifying Qualia Across Possible Worlds. In ‘Southwest Philosophical Studies.’ Vol 32, 1-12
Penultimate version here
Read More“The Complexity of Information Processing Tasks in Vision.’” In Carlos Gershenson, Diederik Aerts, and Bruce Edmonds (eds.) “Philosophy and Complexity: Essays on Epistemology, Evolution, and Emergence.” Singapore: World Scientific 300-314, 2007
The basic presupposition of cognitive science is that mental life is more complicated (or complex) than it appears; there is more to memory, attention, perception and the like, than meets the inner eye. In most mainstream cognitive science, the hidden workings of the mind are treated as information processing systems…Read more here: The Complexity of Information…
Read MoreSystems of Visual Identification: Lessons from Epistemic Logic (with Jaakko Hintikka) in Philosophy of Science 70: 89-104, 2003
This paper shows how developments in epistemic logic can play a nontrivial role in cognitive neuroscience. We argue that the striking correspondence between two modes of identification, as distinguished in the epistemic context, and two cognitive systems distinguished by neuroscientific investigation of the visual system (the “where” and “what” systems) is not coincidental, and that…
Read MoreEmergence and Reflexive Downward Causation
Here’s a PDF: 17094-52642-1-PB
Read More“Explanation, Representation and the Dynamical Hypothesis” Minds and Machines 11: 521-541, 2001
This paper challenges arguments that systematic patterns of intelligent behavior license the claim that representations must play a role in the cognitive system analogous to that played by syntactical structures in a computer program. In place of traditional computational models, I argue that research inspired by Dynamical Systems theory can support an alternative view of representations. My…
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